DRAFT NO. 1

UNCLASSIFIED

SUMMARY

WATCH COMMITTEE

I. PROBLEM

1. To establish a "Watch Committee" which shall be responsible
for forecasting possible "crash" or contingency operations and advising
the director thereof with recommended courses of action.

II. DISCUSSION

2. Past experience in the field of responsibilities assigned PSB
has shown that unless a special group is established to deal with
contingencies, as mentioned above, the entire organization will be
continually seized with such problems (which it is felt are inescapably
the director's responsibility) and its main functions of broad policy
guidance and planning effectively stultified.

3. The staff section charged with this responsibility must be
completely segregated from all other planning functions and must not
be permitted to enmesh other planning sections in its operations.

4. It must combine
4. It must combine top level intelligence and planning ability so that it may discharge equally well both its forecasting and advisory capacities.

III. CONCLUSIONS

A "Watch Committee" initially composed of two highly qualified persons, preferably drawn from F/POL (for recommendations and planning) and from an intelligence division of the services, State, or CIA, with a secretary-stenographer should be established as soon as possible. This section shall be located directly under the Assistant Director of the Office of Coordination with a direct emergency channel authorized to the director.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

(1) That two GS-14s and one GS-7 vacancies be established in this area at once.

(2) That the following persons be approached immediately with the view
the view of filling these positions:

Mr. Edward Roberts (P/POL, State)
(Mr. (Col.) Wm. Godel (G-2, Army)
(Mr. Davis E. Boster (SE, State)
WATCH COMMITTEE

BACKGROUND, ORGANIZATION, OPERATING PROCEDURE

It is assumed that the Director of the Psychological Strategy Board should have a staff unit to follow current operations being conducted by member departments and agencies. The functions of such a unit would be concerned principally with anticipating immediate developments and correcting mistakes. These functions are not in the responsibilities of the Planning, Coordinating and Review sections of the PSB staff as now anticipated.

Attached as Tab A are examples, selected by one of the authors of this paper, of typical operations which would have been of concern to the Director.

The Director may be kept informed of current operations through the members of the Board, one or more of whom will be concerned in all such operations. As the Board is not in constant session, however, this source of information will not be sufficient to allow the Director to keep abreast of fast-moving developments. Staff level contact with the operating agencies is required.

The type of operation with which this staff unit will deal are principally in the overt field. This is the field where the actions of the Board and the Director will be most open to criticism. Hence, the personnel of the unit should be familiar with the techniques of public relations. However, to anticipate developments will require skill in intelligence and public opinion analysis also.
The operating agencies now deal with current emergencies through their own mechanisms. To avoid duplication and muddle the PSB staff unit will work through these mechanisms. This suggests that the proper location of the unit within the PSB staff would be in the Office of Coordination.

Experience has shown that a large part of the difficulties of operating agencies in dealing with emergencies now comes from the fact that the same individuals are charged with both long-range and current operations. (There does exist an interdepartmental Intelligence "watch committee" but it has no authority to influence a covert development.) The PSB staff unit will only function efficiently if set up to operate exclusively as a "watch committee" to follow current developments.

Organization

A unit of two persons located within the Office of Coordination will be able to carry out the required function. Names of individuals with the proper qualifications are included in the Summary.

Operating Procedure

Following is a compilation of "do's" and "don'ts" for the watch committee:

1. Does not participate in planning or sit with planning groups except as they concern current operations.

2. Maintains liaison with our specified individual within each operating agency. This individual need not be one who is involved in all current operations but should be able to arrange the necessary contacts for the PSB representative.
(3) Keeps abreast of world public opinion affecting current operations, especially watching for unfavorable trends.

(4) Advises the Director where necessary to inspire statements or actions to forestall or correct unfavorable developments. As this will usually be a rush operation, the approach should be directly to the Director or his Deputy, keeping the Assistant Director for Coordination informed.

Note: The Director may wish to inspire statements or actions through a member, or members, of the Board. But, with the approval of the Director, this may also be done directly by the "watch committee" with the operating agency concerned. Only with the approval of the Director and the agency concerned will the "watch committee" go directly to the person, inside or outside the government, who is to make the statement or take the action required.

(5) Does not clear speeches by officials of the government but maintains contact (through (2) above) with those who have this responsibility in the operating agency, so as to:

(a) Suggest themes for inclusion in speeches or statements.

(6) Analyzes mistakes in current operations; and

(7) Prepares for the Director reports on mistakes for the operating agency concerned.

(8) Reports at staff meetings on current operations.
MEMORANDUM TO: MR. GRAY
FROM: Bill Korns
SUBJECT: Watch Committee

After six weeks' experience as a one-man Watch Committee, it is my opinion that this function should be abolished.

I have acted in three matters: The Iranian crisis, the disarmament question, and the issue of public statements on fantastic weapons.

Of the three, I feel only the first was properly a spot, crash or watch operation. With the assistance of the staff, I surveyed the interested departments and agencies, and within 48 hours filed a report that stressed the absence of a coordinated policy in Iran and the Middle East as a whole and recommended that PSB go further into the matter. The problem was dealt with, if not correctly, at least directly and quickly.

The other two matters, while of fairly immediate concern, called for action which might appropriately fall to the Office of Coordination at any time. I came on the disarmament proposal by chance, during the course of a P/POL meeting. My initial query to Mr. McWilliams led to Mr. Sherman's talk with Mr. Hickerson, and there the matter ended. Similarly, my talks with ABC and Defense on fantastic weapons were followed by a meeting between the Director and Mr. Dean and the subsequent decision that PSB should prepare a policy paper. In both cases, the information which I gathered could just as easily have been contributed by PSB coordinating officers assigned to the respective agencies.

If this experience has been valid, it would seem that the watch function is at best a sporadic one. It has been agreed from the start that the function would eventually disappear altogether. I feel that time is at hand.

There is, however, a continuing need for information on plans on foot, new ideas, prospective bottlenecks, etc., both in and out of government. The entire staff takes a hand in gathering this information. But the staff will increasingly be burdened with duties which in themselves are limiting. One man, with sufficient contacts and stature to move quickly in any direction, could provide a valuable supplemental flow of information.
TOP SECRET

WATCH COMMITTEE
of the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Report of Indications of Soviet-Communist Intentions

TOP SECRET

From: 28 September 1951
To: 3 October 1951
Washington 25, D. C.
4 October 1951

No. 61

SUMMARY OF INDICATIONS DURING PERIOD

1. KOREA: Enemy activity during the week continued to provide no definite indications of immediate Communist military intentions although the enemy retains the capability of launching a general offensive at any time. There were no significant enemy unit movements suggesting that a general offensive is impending, and no new Communist units were identified. Heavy vehicular sightings were indicative of a continued enemy effort to improve his logistical position. There are some suggestions that the enemy may be fearful of U. N. landings on the North Korean coasts.

The Communists continued to put up jet fighters in sufficient strength to challenge the U. N. air effort over northwest Korea, and the enemy fighter effort is no longer confined to a defense of the Yalu River area but it is being extended southward to interfere with the U. N. interdiction of the Communist supply lines. Unconfirmed reports that two additional airfields in the Antung area are being readied for operations may point to a further expansion of the enemy air effort, and 20 TU-2 light bombers have been moved to Liaoyang, Manchuria, the closest to the Korean border such aircraft have been not. There is some further evidence of the training of North Korean pilots in Manchuria.

Propaganda on the cease-fire talks continues to provide no clear indication of the Communists' political intentions. Chinese Communist statements on the 1 October anniversary reasserted their faith in ultimate victory and maintained that the Communists must continue fighting in Korea.

2. CHINA: The Chinese Communists have again asserted their intention to conquer Formosa, but there are no indications of an early attack. The
MAJIC EYES ONLY:  
Earth’s Encounters with Extraterrestrial Technology

By Ryan S. Wood  
Forward by Jim Marrs

MAJIC EYES ONLY is the most authoritative and comprehensive chronicle ever published on the subject of worldwide UFO crashes and subsequent military retrievals from 1897 to the present. The author guides the reader through 74 UFO crash incidents supported by compelling evidence in the form of official documents, eyewitnesses and in some cases physical evidence.

Since 1984, multiple sources have leaked, revealed or discovered some 3,500 pages of UFO documents, hundreds classified Top Secret and linked to Majestic-12. These MJ-12 documents, coupled with the Leonard Stringfield data and strong investigations by other case experts, provide a powerful core of UFO crash incidents.

The idea that major governments have covered up the true nature of the UFO phenomenon for more than half a century through unprecedented secrecy, deception and intimidation strikes many reasonable citizens as preposterous. Yet, this book provides a wealth of evidence, including declassified and leaked government documents and credible eyewitness testimony, that supports the uncomfortable truth of this “preposterous” notion.